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[Vol. XXXI

As government strives to apply its extended powers to resolve today's
complex problems, legislators should remember Justice Holmes' statement
in Pennsylvania Coal:96 "a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." The instant case indicates that
by augmenting regulation with conciliation designed to ensure the protection
of private property, government is provided with a new means by which to
pay the constitutional price of promoting the common good.
IRA PAULL

FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE:
LIMITING ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978)
Respondent, a citizen of Iowa,' brought a wrongful death action2 against
a Nebraska corporation, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD),a in federal
district court basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. 4 OPPD filed a third-

party complaint 5 against petitioner. 6 The court permitted respondent to amend

is an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power constituting a taking without just
compensation, the court shall remand the matter to the agency which shall, within a
reasonable time: (1) Agree to issue the permit; or (2) Agree to pay appropriate monetary
damages, provided however, in determining the amount of compensation to be paid,
consideration shall be given by the court to any enhancement to the value of the land
attributable to governmental action; or (3) Agree to modify its decision to avoid an unreasonable exercise of police power." 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-85, §3 (emphasis supplied).
96. 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
1. 98 S. Ct. 2396, 2399 (1978).
2. Id. at 2399. Respondent's husband was electrocuted in the course of his employment
when the boom of a steel crane came in contact with high-tension electric power lines
operated by OPPD. The crane was owned by petitioner, Owen Equipment and Erection
Company.
3. OPPD, a public corporation established under the laws of Nebraska, has its principal
place of business in Omaha. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 428-29
(8th Cir. 1977). For diversity suit purposes, this makes OPPD a citizen of Nebraska. See
note 4 infra.
4. 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1970), as amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-583, §3,
90 Stat. 2891 (1976), which governs federal court jurisdiction in diversity suits, provides
that: "(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is between- (I) citizens of different states; . . . (c) For the purpose of this section . . .
a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated
and of the State where it has its principal place of business ..
"
6. The third-party complaint was filed pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). In part, that
rule states: "At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a thirdparty plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him." See text accompanying notes 31-35 infra, concerning the purpose behind rule
14.
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her complaint under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
make petitioner an additional defendant. Before trial OPPD moved for and
was granted summary judgment,8 leaving petitioner and respondent the only
parties to the suit. On the third day of trial, testimony9 established that Iowa
was petitioner's principal place of business. ° Petitioner moved for dismissal,
challenging the court's jurisdiction over the action on the basis of nondiversity.11 The district court denied the motion, ruling that an independent
basis of jurisdiction was not necessary for a plaintiff to bring a claim against
a Rule 14 third-party defendant.12 The court of appeals affirmed.2" The SuThis rule 14(a) impleader action should be distinguished from the interpleader action,
rule 22(l), which provides in part: "Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be
joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the
plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability," and from 28 U.S.C. §1335
(1976) (statutory interpleader).
6. OPPD's third-party complaint alleged that petitioner's negligence proximately caused
the death of respondent's husband. After a 1948 amendment to rule 14(a), defendants
could no longer implead parties who might be liable to the plaintiff unless they were also
derivatively liable to the original defendant. Advisory Committee Report, 5 F.R.D. 433,
446 (1946). The complaint failed to allege petitioner's liability to OPPD, but petitioner
never challenged the complaint's validity. 98 S. Ct. at 2400 n.3.
7. FED. R. Crv. P. 14(a) further provides that a "plaintiff may assert any claim against
the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff...."
8. 98 S. Ct. at 2400 n.4, see Kroger v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 523 F.2d 161, 164 (8th
Cir. 1975). As a matter of law the district court found that OPPD owed no duty to respondent's deceased husband because it did not own or maintain the electric lines.
9. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d at 419.
10. 98 S. Ct. at 2400 n.5. The Missouri River, which marks the boundary between
Iowa and Nebraska, had shifted so that petitioner's main office, once located within
Nebraska, was currently situated in Carter Lake, Iowa. For purposes of diversity actions,
petitioner was thus a citizen of Iowa.
11. 98 S.Ct. at 2400. See note 4 supra.
12. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d at 419, citing Union Bank & Trust
Co. v. St. Paul Fire 9- Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 486 (D. Neb. 1965) (ancillary jurisdiction
exercised over a third-party defendant's claim asserted against a non-diverse plaintiff);
Olson v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D. Neb. 1965) (following the minority view, independent jurisdiction not needed for a plaintiff to assert a nonfederal claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant pursuant to rule 14). See text accompanying notes 31-35 and
notes 43-45 infra.
13. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F. 2d at 428. The Eighth Circuit agreed
that the trial court had the discretionary power to exercise jurisdiction over the claim due
to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction and the Supreme Court's decision in United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 US. 715 (1966). 558 F.2d at 424-27. For a discussion of the Gibbs
decision, see text 'accompanying notes 46-52 infra. The court also held that petitioner, by
not properly denying its Nebraska citizenship, was estopped from asserting abuse of discretion by the trial court. 558 F.2d at 427.
Ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts "generally involves either proceedings which
are concerned with pleadings, processes, records or judgments of court in principal case or
proceedings which affect property already in court's custody. The ancillary process must be
to aid, enjoin, or regulate original suit and prevent relitigation in other courts of issues
heard and adjudged in such suit." BLAcK's LAw DXcnoNARY 112 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Use of
ancillary jurisdiction has expanded beyond this definition. "Ancillary jurisdiction is a
broader concept [than pendent jurisdiction] allowing a court to acquire control of an
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preme Court granted certiorari, 14 reversed, and HELD, in a diversity suit,
a federal court lacks the power to hear a plaintiff's claim against a third-party
5
defendant without an independent basis of jurisdiction over that claim.'
Article III of the Constitution 0 and federal statutes' 7 delineate the extent
of original jurisdiction of the federal courts. During the nineteenth century
the courts developed ancillary jurisdiction in equity 8 in order to expand
their power to cover supplementary claims, typically involving additional
parties over which the court lacked an independent basis of jurisdiction. The
first cases developing this jurisdictional doctrine allowed nondiverse claimants
to intervene in federal actions when necessary to protect their interests in
assets disputed in the principal action which were within the court's court.'

9

entire controversy, both the claims and additional parties, where it has no independent
jurisdiction of one or more parties." Jacobs v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (D.
Ariz. 1973). See text accompanying note 25 infra, for further explanation of the expansion
of the doctrine; see note 46 infra, for a discussion of pendent jurisdiction.
14. 98 S. Ct. at 2399. The Court granted certiorari because of a conflict among the
circuits. The Eighth Circuit in the instant case allowed plaintiff's claim against the thirdparty to stand without an independent basis of jurisdiction. Kroger v. Owen Equip. &
Erection Co., 558 F.2d at 424-26. The Supreme Court noted contrary opinions, 98 S. Ct.
at 2399 n.l: Fawvor v. Texico, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977) (strictly construing rule
14 in conjunction with the diversity statute, 28 U.'S.C. §1332, and dismissing plaintiff's
complaint against a nondiverse third-party defendant); Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 533 F.2d 325
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (holding that the district court had abused its
discretion in hearing plaintiff's claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant after
plaintiff and the original defendant had settled before trial).
15. 98 S. Ct. at 2405 n.21. After the Supreme Court reached this result there was no
need to consider the Eighth Circuit's holding as to the issue of estoppel. See note 13 supra.
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl.1 provides federal courts with original jurisdiction over
"all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
" It also extends judicial power to "controversies between two or more
and treaties ..
States, between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different
States .... " For an interpretation of this constitutional limitation on diversity jurisdiction
see note 33 infra.
17. 28 U.S.C. §1331 grants federal courts original jurisdiction over federal question
claims, and 28 U.S.C. §1332 grants jurisdiction over diversity actions. See note 4 supra.
18. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861). This ancillary suit was a replevin
action by the defendants against the marshall who had custody over their attached property.
Defendants and the marshall had common citizenship and no federal question was raised.
Accord, Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885), where the court did not need independent
jurisdiction over additional creditors of defendant when the creditors joined the suit as
co-claimants.
19. Thus, in Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925), the Court was
confronted with a controversy concerning property; because the property claimed had not
been impounded there was no power of ancillary jurisdiction over the additional creditors'
claims. See cases cited in note 18 supra and Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S.
356, 366 (1921) in which the Court allowed co-citizens of defendant to be joined in a class
action questioning the disposition of a trust fund. Because the decree would bind all
members, regardless of citizenship, the Court granted ancillary jurisdiction. See also 6 C.
(1971) (ancillary
CIVIL §1444
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
WRIGHT & A.
jurisdiction originally employed as matter of necessity, such as with ownership of property).
But see Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U.S. 329 (1887) (ancillary jurisdiction
exercised with no property before the court, although assets were the subject of litigation);
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Exchange20
The Supreme Court decision in Moore v. New York' Cotton
enabled lower federal courts to adjudicate a defendant's compulsory counterclaim without independent jurisdiction although the original federal question
21
claim was dismissed on its merits. The basis of the Court's jurisdictionbl de22
cision in Moore was a Federal Equity Rule; however, the holding provided
the underlying precedent for future expansions of the doctrine of aicillary
jurisdiction2
In 1988, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted with pro24
visions encouraging joinder of parties and claims. To further extend their
jurisdiction in
jurisdictional powers, the courts began applying ancillary
25
14 of the
Rule
actions.
connection with the Federal Rules and multiparty
implead
can
plaintiffs,
Federal Rules provides that defendants, as third-party
26
over
jurisdiction
third-party defendants, but the rule does not grant original
Partridge v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 573 (1872) (ancillary jurisdiction exercised over set-off claim, with no property before the court).
20. 270 US. 593 (1926). Plaintiffs federal question claim against the Cotton Exchange
alleged violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Exchange, with the same citizenship
as the plaintiff, asserted a nonfederal compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiff.
21. Id. at 608. The Court disputed the plaintiff's claim that the original bill was dismissed for lack of jurisdictional facts. The argument that the original claim was dismissed
on its merits is similar to the "substantial" federal claim requirement discussed in United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). See note 49 infra and accompanying text.
22. Under Federal Equity Rule 30 there were two types of counterclaims: those "arising
out of the transaction which is the subject matter of the suit" (compare with FED. R. Civ.
P. 13(a) compulsory counterclaims) and those "which might be the subject of an independent
suit in equity." It was clear to the courts that under the rule the first type of counterclaim did not require an independent basis of federal jurisdiction. See generally 4 Wis. L. REv.
43 (1926).
23. See Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction,
33 U. Prrr. L. Rrv. 759, 762 n.23 (1972) (ancillary jurisdiction assumed its present importance with the Moore decision); Note, Rule 14 Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 57
jurisVA. L. REv. 265, 268 (1971) (Moore was the foundation of the expansion of ancillary
diction).
24. See FED. R. Crv. P. 18 (which provides for joinder of claims against an opposing
party and joinder of remedies); FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (counterclaim and cross-claim); Fan. R.
Crv. P. 14 (third-party practice; see note 5 supra); FD. R. Cav. P. 19 (joinder of persons
needed for just adjudication); FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties); FED. R.
Civ. P. 22 (interpleader; see note 5 supra); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (class actions); FED. R. Crv.
P. 24 (intervention); FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (consolidation of separate trials and severance of
joined actions). See also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) ("Under
the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent
with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.").
Comment, Federal Jurisdiction-Ancillary Jurisdiction-Although Both Original Diverse
Defendants Are Dismissed Prior to Trial, Trial Court Has Discretion to Retain Ancillary
Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's Claim Against Third-Party Defendant Asserted Under Rule 14
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 416, 425 (1978) (where
the author makes note of the rules' liberal provisions for joinder of parties and claims).
25. E.g., Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960) (intervention by right); Glens
Falls Indem. Co. v. United States, 229 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1956) (cross-claim); Lankford v.
Ryder Truck Sys., Inc., 41 F.RD. 430 (D. S.C. 1967) (impleader); Heintz & Co. v. Provident
Tradesman Bank & Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (third-party defendant's
claim against original plaintiff).
26. See note 5 supra for provisions of rule 14.
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the impleader actions27 Courts have consistently claimed ancillary jurisdiction over third-party complaints without an independent basis of jurisdiction
between the third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant.1 s Rule 14 also

provides for original plaintiffs to assert complaints against third-party de-

fendants,29 but courts have been divided in their application of ancillary
jurisdiction to these actions.O
Prior to March, 1948, Rule 14 allowed a defendant to join third parties
who were allegedly liable to the plaintiff for the claim asserted against the
defendant. 31 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Friend v. Middle Atlantic
Transportation Co.32 held that although such joinders were convenient, the
boundaries placed on federal jurisdiction 33 precluded joinder when the third27, FED. R. Cav. P. 82 states that the Rules should not be read to extend or limit
jurisdiction of federal courts. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337-38 (1969) (interpretation of jurisdictional statute cannot be changed by the Rules).
28. E.g., Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1965); Dery v. Wyler, 265 F.2d 804,
808 (2d Cir. 1959) (ancillary jurisdiction over third-party complaint sun ived settlement of
original claim because subsequent events should not change jurisdictional prerequisites
satisfied at the beginning of the suit); Sheppard v. Ad. States Gas Co. of Pa., 167 F.2d 841
(3d Cir. 1948). See IA BARRON & HOLTZOEF, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE §424 (1960)
(third-party claim by defendant against third person liable to him for all or part of the
original claim in the suit dearly is involved closely in the subject matter of the original
action).
29. See note 7 supra.
30. See the majority and minority cases and their respective rationales in notes 39-45
infra and accompanying text.
31. Advisory Committee Report, 5 F.R.D. 433, 446 (1946) (original language and 1948
amendment, see text accompanying note 36 infra). For amended language of rule 14 see
note 5 supra.
32. 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1946). A citizen of Connecticut sued a New York corporation
and an Ohio citizen for damages in an auto accident. Defendants removed the suit from
the Connecticut state court to federal court and joined another Connecticut citizen to
answer to plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff's complaint was subsequently amended to assert a
negligence claim against the third-party defendant. The court recognized that ancillary
jurisdiction may have been used if contribution between joint tortfeasors had been
involved. Contribution, however, was not allowed in Connecticut; therefore, the court
viewed the plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant as a joint claim with the
others and held that ancillary jurisdiction could not be applied. Id. at 780.
33. iThe boundaries placed on federal jurisdiction by Congress which are relevant in
this case are 28 U.S.C. §1332 and FED. R. Civ. P. 82. See note 4 supra concerning 28 U.S.C.
§1332, which has consistently been interpreted as requiring complete diversity between
all plaintiffs and all defendants. Complete diversity is not constitutionally mandated. See
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (case which laid down the "complete
diversity" rule subsequently incorporated in 28 U.S.C. §1332). Accord, American Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951) (plaintiff's claim against several defendants, one of
which was nondiverse, remanded to state court because federal court jurisdiction is carefully guarded against expansion); Seyler v. Steuben Motors, Inc., 462 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.
1972) (doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction did not apply when plaintiff brought
diversity action against several defendants, one of whom was a co-citizen of plaintiff); 3A
Moo, 's FEDERAL PRAcrE §22.04 at 22-24 (2d ed. 1948). Cf. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) (because complete diversity is not a constitutional require.
ment minimum diversity required for interpleader actions is adequate). See notes 5 & 16
SuPra.
See rule 82, note 27 supra. But see Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
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and the plaintiff were co-citizens. A number of federal district
party defendant
35
courts34 felt that the Friendholding would impair Rule 14's practical effect,
which was to avoid circuitous action and multiple lawsuits. Therefore, they
allowed joinder of third-party defendants under the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction.
Rule 14 was amended in 1948 so that a defendant could no longer implead
36
third parties who may be liable only to the plaintiff. The drafters of the
amendment felt that in any case in which the plaintiff could not have
originally joined the third party due to lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff
should not be allowed to add a claim against a third party by amending the
38
complaintY7 The majority of courts have followed this view, denying ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiff-third-party defendant claims for several
reasons: first, plaintiffs should not be allowed to do indirectly what they
could not do direcly;3 9 second, there is a possibility of collusion between
40
plaintiffs and cooperative original defendants; third, federal dockets are so
426 F.2d 709, 717 (5th Cir. 1970) (ancillary jurisdiction over rule 14 type claims existed
before codification of the Federal Rules, and rule 82 took this fact into consideration);
Note, supra note 23 at 277 (mere broadening in scope of a single action properly before
court does not expand jurisdiction and therefore does not exceed rule 82).
34. E.g., Kelly v. Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co., 11 Fed. R. Serv. 14a 62, Case 8, 215 (W.D.
Okla. 1948); Myer v. Lyford, 2 F.R.D. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1942) (joinder allowed to dispose of
entire case on its merits at one trial); Malkin v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948 (D. Md. 1941)

(ancillary jurisdiction recognized over third-party complaint and then plaintiff required to

amend complaint against nondiverse third-party defendant as joint tortfeasor with original
defendant); Skylar v. Hayes, 1 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
35. See Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts,
33 F.R.D. 27, 27 (1963) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were invoked to prevent piecemeal litigation); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Cm. L.
Rrv. 1, 32 (1968) (critical collision occurs between Strawbridge complete diversity requirement and liberal joinder philosophy of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encouraging
judicial economy); Note, supra note 23, at 265 (effectiveness of rule 14 device would be
undermined if the traditional diversity requirement is strictly applied).
36. Advisory Committee Report, 5 F.R.D. 433, 446 (1946).
37. Id. at 447.
38. E.g., Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (majority view, but even if the matter had been within the discretion of the court, the claim
would have been denied due to confusion caused to the jury); Corbi v. United States, 298
F. Supp. 521 (W.. Pa. 1969) (following majority view; see text accompanying notes 39-42
infra).
39. McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466, 470 (6th Cir. 1960) (plaintiff could not have
sued nondiverse third-party defendant in federal court). Accord, Rosario v. American
Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., Rosario v.
United States, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); Palumbo v. Western Md. Ry., 271 F. Supp. 361 (D. Md.
1967). But see 3 MooRE's DMERAL PRAGrME §14.27(1) at 570-71 (2d ed. 1974); Fraser, supra
note 35, at 38.
40. The fear is that plaintiff could find a diverse "friendly" defendant who would
agree to implead a nondiverse third-party defendant whom the plaintiff could not otherwise sue in federal court. See, e.g., Kerose Mfg. C., Inc. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d
890, 893-94 (4th Cir. 1972), citng Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesman Bank & Trust Co.,
30 F.R.D. 171 (EM. Pa. 1962) (although no collusion would exist when third-party defendant brings a claim against the original plaintiff, court foresees possibility of collusion
if plaintiff is allowed to amend complaint to bring claim against resident third-party de-
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overburdened that they should not contend with litigation that belongs in
state court;4 1 and finally, Rule 82 forbids expansion of federal court jurisdiction through the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
A minority of courts, 43 however, used ancillary jurisdiction to entertain
such claims without an independent basis of jurisdiction. These courts found
no express provisions in Rule 14 requiring an independent basis for jurisdiction 4 and felt that the possibility of collusion in some cases should not prevent
the use of ancillary jurisdiction in all cases.45
Distinguishable from ancillary jurisdiction is the concept of pendent
jurisdiction,4 6 which grants a federal court power to hear the plaintiffs state
claim along with a federal claim already before the court. The Supreme
fendant). But see 3 MooRE's, supra note 39, at §14.27(1) (because of 1948 amendment to
rule 14, defendant can no longer implead on theory of liability to plaintiff, diminishing
chances of collusion); Note, supra note 23, at 275 (number of actions where collusion would
actually occur would be small and 28 U.S.C. §1359 (1964) was enacted to provide courts

with authority to dismiss these cases).

41. Ayoub v. Helm's Express, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1969) ("convenience
and saving of time" could be accomplished as a matter of right in one suit in state courts).
See Frank, Let's Keep Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 FoRuM 157 (1973) (only reason for the
American Law Institute proposal to limit diversity jurisdiction in federal courts is to
lighten case load). See note 89 infra for a discussion of the ALI proposal.
42. See notes 27 and 33 supra. But see 3 MooRE's, supra note 89, at §14.27(1) (rule 14
does not expand jurisdiction but merely provides opportunity for full exercise of ancillary
jurisdiction in additional situations).
43. E.g., Davis v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (state claim of

plaintiff against third-party defendant was so intertwined with a claim under the Federal
Tort Claims Act that the court exercised its power of pendent jurisdiction, although this
appropriately was an ancillary claim). For other minority view cases see notes 44-45 infra.
See also Holtzoff, Entry of Additional Parties in a Civil Action, 81 F.R.D. 101, 110 (1963)
(majority view may frustrate some beneficial aspects of third-party practice).
44. E.g., Buresch v. American La France, 290 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (discretionary power of court to exercise ancillary jurisdiction extends to a plaintiff/third-party
defendant claim). Accord, CCF Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., -92 F. Supp. 1259
(E.D. Pa. 1975). The plaintiff in CCF Indus. Park sued a heating system manufacturer in a
products liability action to recover damages from fire. The manufacturer filed a thirdparty complaint against the installer of the heating system. The court subsequently
allowed the plaintiff to file the same complaint against the third-party defendant.
45. E.g., Olson v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D. Neb. 1965) (each case should be
viewed individually and the plaintiff/third-party defendant claim barred only if collusion
actually exists). Accord, Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., Inc., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D. Kan.
1975) (no hint of collusion in this case and ancillary claim allowed to serve the "ends of
justice"). See note 40 supra.
46. Pendent jurisdiction occurs when "[o]riginal jurisdiction resting under federal
claim extends to any nonfederal claim against same defendant if the federal question is
substantial and the federal and nonfederal claims constitute a single cause of action."
BLAcK's LAW DICTONARY 1290 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). For further explanation of pendent
jurisdiction see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (see text accompanying
notes 47-52 infra); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1938) (federal claim basd on copyright
laws was dismissed and pendent jurisdiction was invoked to hear state claim for unfair
business practices and competition); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.. (9
Wheat) 738 (1824) (the act of incorporation of the Bank gave federal courts jurisdiction
over suits by and against the Bank, and the pendent state claims were against the bank
officers as individuals).
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Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs4 upheld an expanded concept of

pendent jurisdiction by deciding a state law claim against the defendant
although the main federal claim against the same party had been dismissed
after trial. The Court set forth a flexible test" for determining when a court
could hear state claims asserted in conjunction with a "substantial" 49 federal
claim: if both the federal and state claims against a party before the court
derive from a common nucleus of operative facts, and if they would ordinarily
be tried in a single proceeding, the court has power to hear the state claim. 50

According to Gibbs, pendent jurisdiction over the state claim is a matter left
to the court's discretion in light of considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants.5 ' The Court suggested that if the federal
claim were dismissed before trial, an abuse of discretion would occur if the
state claim were not also dismissedU

Several district courts read the Gibbs decision broadly as indicative of a
trend, 53 the intent of which would permit federal courts to hear both pendent
47. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Plaintiff's federal claims against the union for the secondary
boycott and for interference with his contracts of employment and haulage were brought
under §303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §187 (1947). His state law
claim asserted unlawful conspiracy and an unlawful boycott, based on the common law of
Tennessee. 383 US. at 717-20. The trial court sustained defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding verdict on the federal claim and ordered a remitted award on the state
law claim. Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 220 F. Supp. 871, 880-81 (E.D. Tenn. 1963),

afJ'd, 343 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1965).
48. Compare Gibbs with Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 US. 175, 191-92
(1909) (if based on a federal question which is raised in good faith and not merely colorable,
the court has the right to hear all questions in the case) and Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238,
245 (1933) (if two grounds are presented in support of a single cause of action, only one
of which presents a federal question, the court may retain the nonfederal ground as long
as the federal question is not wanting in substance).
49. See note 47 supra. See Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 657, 659 (1968) (substantialness of federal claim means a federal court would ordinarily
assume jurisdiction over it).
50. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. See 3 MooRE's, supra note 39, at
§14.27(1) (Gibbs reemphasizes a fundamental principle that the federal courts have jurisdictional power to adjudicate the whole case).
51. 383 U.Sat726.
52. Id. Accord, Iding v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (declined to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over an unfair competition claim based on state law after dismissal
of main claim, relying on Gibbs); Stone v. Local 29, Int'l Bd. of Boilermakers, 262 F. Supp.
961 (D. Mass. 1967) (court dismissed first count of action and therefore dismissed pendent
count, citing Gibbs). But see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (mootness of the
federal claim should only be a factor affecting the court's discretion, not its power, to
retain a pendent claim); Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 541 F.2d 226, 227 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 430 US. 915 (1976) (whether court should entertain pendent claims after
dismissal of federal claim is question of discretion, not power); 3 MooRE's, supra note 39, at
§14.27(1) (according to most subsequent cases this statement in Gibbs was mere dictum; dismissal of original claim before trial is only one factor for the court to consider in using
its discretion).
53. Davis v. United States, 350 F. Supp. at 208 ("[t]o read Gibbs to apply only to situations wherein there is one plaintiff and one defendant having two claims between them ...
is to destroy the spirit of the case'); Buresch v. American La France, 290 F. Supp. at 266
(court found no express provision in rule 14 requiring diverse citizenship between a plaintiff
and a third-party defendant against whom the plaintiff asserts a claim).
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and ancillary claims falling within the limits of the "nucleus of operative
facts" test. 54 Due to the doctrinal similarities between pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction, and judicial confusion of the two concepts,55 the expansion of
pendent jurisdiction thus spurred an additional expansion of ancillary jurisdiction.56
Adding to the confusion between ancillary jurisdiction and pendent
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court applied the hybrid concept of "pendentparty" jurisdiction5 7 in Aldinger v. Howard.5s In Aldinger, the plaintiff wished
to join an additional nondiverse party as a defendant for the purpose of
asserting a state law claim arising from a nucleus of operative facts common
to the federal and state claims.59 The nonfederal complaint requiring new
54. Davis v. United States, 350 F. Supp. at 208. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
55. See, e.g., id. at 207 (proper to apply doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to a plaintiff's
ancillary claim against a third-party defendant); Buresch v. American La France, 290 F.
Supp. at 266 ("to deny pendent jurisdiction would defeat the raison d'etre of ancillary
jurisdiction"); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 486,
489 (D. Neb. 1965) ("it is the feeling of this court that the concept of ancillary or
pendent jurisdiction is soundly and justifiably applied in an instance such as this"). See also
Note, Jurisdictional Requirements for Plaintiff's Claim Against Impleaded Third Party
Defendant, 26 U. KAN. L. REv. 493, 495 (1978) (Gibbs decision could be applied to ancillary or pendent jurisdiction due to doctrinal similarities).
56. E.g., CCF Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259, 1260-61 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (in allowing plaintiff's negligence claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant,
the court joined other jurisdictions in holding that the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction
was permissible under the discretionary powers of federal courts). For further examples, see
note 52 supra. See also Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 892 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968) (ancillary jurisdiction expanded to cover claim which lacked requisite jurisdictional amount
or value); Baker, supra note 23 at 763 (Gibbs expansion equally applicable to ancillary
Circuit Court of
jurisdiction). But see Comment, Federal Courts-Jurisdiction -Eighth
Appeals Holds Ancillary Jurisdiction Supports Plaintiff's Claim Against Impleaded NonDiverse Third Party Defendant, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 631, 641 (1977) (Gibbs holding
arguably limited to exercise of pendent jurisdiction over federal question claims).
57. "Pendent-party" jurisdiction was developed by superimposing the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction (involving additional claims) upon the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
(involving additional parties) in order to assert a pendent state law claim against one
not already a party to the jurisdiction-conferring claim. See Comment, Aldinger v. Howard
and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 COLuM. L. REV. 127, 136 (1977); Recent Developments:
Pendent Jurisdiction Against Additional Parties, 41 ALB. L. REV. 389, 395 (1977). "Pendentparty" jurisdiction was introduced by lower federal courts following the Gibbs expansion
of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine. E.g., Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972); Hartridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809
(8th Cir. 1969); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1968). The Supreme
Court had recognized "pendent-party" jurisdiction in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693 (1973), but was not required to decide the issue of judicial power over such claims
because it decided that the lower court had properly exercised its discretion, by dismissing the case. See also Jacobs v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (D. Ariz. 1973) (hybrid "pendent-party" may confuse the semantic distinctions of earlier cases).
58. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
59. Id. at 13. For an explanation of the Gibbs test see text accompanying note 50 supra.
Petitioner had been discharged from her job with respondent county treasurer because of
her alleged cohabitation with her boyfriend. She claimed her discharge violated her
constitutional rights and filed a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§1983. Her state claim requested both an injunction restraining her dismissal and damages
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parties to be called into court was viewed in Aldinger as a "more serious
obstacle" to a justifiable application of pendent jurisdictionO than the state
claim in Gibbs, which was litigated by parties already properly before the
federal court.
The Aldinger court added a statutory criterion to the Gibbs threshold:6 1
the posture in which the pendent claim is asserted62 must be studied along
with the statutory language to assure that Congress did not intend to deny
the courts power to hear such a claim.6 3 The original claim in Aldinger arose
under a federal civil rights statute. 64 The Court found that Congress, by the
language of that statute, intended to exclude the specific pendent party in
question 5 from the Court's jurisdiction.
Conflicting decisions continued among the circuitso involving ancillary
jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims against nondiverse third-party defendants.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals67 refused to adopt a rule precluding ancillary jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim until the Supreme Court ruled on
the issue, and merely held that the lower court had abused its discretion in
retaining an ancillary claim. In 1977, the Eighth Circuits held that the expansion of pendent jurisdiction in Gibbs should be extended to ancillary
jurisdiction and that the trial court had the discretion to hear the plaintiff's
for loss of salary. The state claim was brought against the county on the basis of vicarious
liability for the tortious conduct of its officials.
60. 427 U.S. at 18. See text accompanying notes 97-99 infra, discussing the instant
Court's failure to consider this obstacle.
61. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
62. 98 S. Ct. at 2404, citing Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. at 14. The Aldinger court
discussed the factual and legal differences from the Gibbs situation and noted, in particular, the addition of a party not already properly before the court.
63. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 US. at 17. See also Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414
U.S. 291, 294 (1973) (study of congressional intent behind 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) indicates
that each separate claim within a class action must meet the jurisdictional amount requirement); Comment, Federal Jurisdiction: Federal Court Has Power to Hear Rule 14 Claim
by Plaintiff Against Nondiverse Third Party Defendant, 62 MINN. L. Rxv. 251, 261 (1978)

(Congress had not spoken on federal jurisdiction over pendent state law claims; hence, the
Gibbs Court was free to look only to constitutional limitations).
64. 42 US.C. §1983.
65. 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides that: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
subjects or causes to be subjected . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured... 1"
The Court, looking to the intent of Congress, found counties to be excluded from the
"persons" subject to the statute. The Court further held that the statute conferring
jurisdiction, 28 US.C. §1343(3), should be construed using the same restrictions as the
substantive cause of action. 427 U.S. at 16-17.
66. Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977) (expressing majority view
of courts and dismissing ancillary claim for lack of diversity jurisdiction); Rosario v.
American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1976) (majority view
applied where principal claim was federal question brought under Federal Tort Claims
Act). But see Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430
US. 915 (1976) (expressing minority view that although federal claim was dismissed before
trial, court's decision to retain state claim was within its discretionary power).
67. Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 533 F.2d 325 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
68. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 98, S. Ct.

2396 (1978).
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claim against a co-citizen third-party defendant even though the main claim
69
had been dismissed prior to trial
In the instant case, the Supreme Court, although differentiating between
70
pendent jurisdiction in Gibbs and ancillary jurisdiction in the case at hand,
viewed these doctrines as being generally related to the single problem of
determining under what circumstances federal courts may entertain state law
claims litigated between nondiverse parties.71 Because the Court perceived
2
the Gibbs test for
this relationship between the doctrines, it assumed
pendent jurisdiction to be the constitutional minimum required to exercise
federal judicial power under both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. In addi73
tion, the majority required application of the Aldinger statutory test before
conferring jurisdiction upon the court. Applying this test, the Court noted
that the federal statute 4 granting jurisdiction over the main claim in the
7
instant case has consistently been interpreted to require complete diversity, 5
and that to allow jurisdiction over respondent's claim against petitioner
would destroy complete diversity. The Court refused to allow circumvention
of complete diversity, reasoning that to hold otherwise would only serve to
courts and wait
encourage plaintiffs to sue any diverse defendants in federal
76
opponents.
nondiverse
the
implead
to
defendants
the
for
Justice White, dissenting,7 7 criticized the majority's expansion of both
the complete diversity requirement 78 and the expressly limited holding in
Aldinger.79 In his view, the majority overlooked the distinction made in
Aldinger between circumstances involving an addition of new parties to the
lawsuit and a situation, as in the instant case, where new parties are not
joined. Justice White believed that the majority also failed to consider the
69. See note 52 supra and accompanying text for other courts' decisions as to relevancy
of dismissal of main claim before trial.
70. 98 S.Ct. at 2401. The Supreme Court, as in Aldinger, did not see any need to determine the principal distinctions between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction or the effect
these distinctions may have on decisions. See Note, supra note 23, at 271 (distinction between ancillary and pendent jurisdiction only complicates the question central to both
as to when federal judicial power exists over state law claims between nondiverse parties).
71. 98 S. CL at 2401.
72. Id. at 2401-02. The Eighth Circuit in the instant case applied the Gibbs "constitutional minimum" test to the diversity action. However, Gibbs involved a federal question
claim. The Supreme Court failed to confront this distinction. Id. at 2402 n.10.
73. Id. at 2402. For a discussion of the Adlinger test see text accompanying notes 62-63

supra.
74. 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1) (1976). See note 4 supra.
75. See note 33 supra.
76. 98 S. Ct. at 2403. For a discussion of majority view's fear of collusion, see note 40
supra and accompanying text.
77. 98 S. Ct. at 2405-08 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined in the dissent.
78. Id. at 2406. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 n.6 (1967),
indicating that Strawbridge is not to be given an expansive reading by the Court.
79. 98 S. Ct. at 2406 n.3, citing Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. at 18: "[W]e decide here
only the issue of so-called 'pendent party' jurisdiction with respect to a claim brought
under §§1343(3) and 1983." See Note, supra note 24, at 422 (recognizing that the Supreme
Court checked the expansion of pendent-party jurisdiction in Aldinger, but in a limited

context).
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purposes served by ancillary jurisdiction: convenience, judicial economy, and
fairness. 0 The dissent would demand complete diversity only between the
plaintiff and the parties that the plaintiff brings to the suit,81 leaving ancillary
82
jurisdiction to the court's discretion.
The Supreme Court expressed its desire to preserve federal jurisdictional
limitations mandated by Congress in the federal diversity statute.8 3 Ancillary
jurisdiction, however, was judicially created 84 as an expanded interpretation
of those congressional jurisdictional limitations in order to allow a greater
number of claims and persons into federal courts within a single proceeding. A broad view of the instant holding finds the Supreme Court reversing
directions, moving toward a possible expansion 85 of the complete diversity requirement"8 and thereby closing its doors to many state claims. The Court's
decision indicates a policy against a diversity jurisdiction framework which
allows otherwise nonfederal s 7 claims to be brought in federal court through
strategic defendant selection. This policy could be used to invalidate other
ancillary Rule 14 claims which are joined with principal diversity actions but
lack original jurisdictional basis.88 A trend towards restricting these state
claims to the state courts is not unexpected in light of a previous proposal89
80. These considerations were recognized in Gibbs. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
81. 98 S. Ct. at 2408. See text accompanying note 75 supra for limitation placed by
this Court on Strawbridge requirement of complete diversity.
82. Id. at 2408 n.7, following Gibbs. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
83. 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1976). See 98 S. Ct. at 2403; C. WIGHTrr & A. MnJR, §1444, supra
note 19, at 221: "The decision [whether or not a court has ancillary jurisdiction] ultimately
will be based on a weighing of the court's desire to preserve the integrity of constitutionally
based jurisdictional limitations against the desire to dispose of all disputes arising from
one set of facts in one action."
84, See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the development
of ancillary jurisdiction. See C. WRIGHT & A. MxrrL= §1444, supra note 19, at 218-19 (describing ancillary jurisdiction as ill defined judicially developed concept).
85. 98 S. Ct. at 2406 (White, J., dissenting).
86. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See note 3 supra.
87. The Court defines "nonfederal" claims as those over which there is no independent
basis for federal jurisdiction. 98 S. Ct. at 2402 n.11.
88. The other possible rule 14 claims consist of: (1) the original impleader claim, see
note 5 supra; (2) the third-party defendant's counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff;
(3) the third-party defendant's cross-claims against other third-party defendants; and (4)
the third-party defendant's claim against the plaintiff, arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff.
Justice White, dissenting, had difficulty reconciling the majority's strict reading of §1332
which seems to approve of the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over impleader, cross-claims,
and counterclaims. 98 S. Ct. at 2406. The majority opinion, however, could be read as
acknowledgment but not approval of past applications of ancillary jurisdiction over these
other rule 14 claims. Id. at 2404.
89. S. 1876, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. §§1301-1307 (1971); cf. 28 U.S.C. §§1332, 1359, 1391, 1401,
1441 (1971) (the Senate bill, a result of the American Law Institute study proposed by the
late Chief Justice Earl Warren, would change all of the current statutes in order to limit
federal diversity competence). See Burdick, Diversity Jurisdiction Under the American Law
Institute Proposals:Its Purpose and its Effects on State and Federal Courts, 48 N.D. L. REv.
1 (1971) (purpose of proposal was to gain a proper jurisdictional balance between federal
and state court systems, assigning to each judicial system those cases most appropriate in
light of basic principles of federalism). Cf. Frank, supr-a note 41, at 157 (the only reason
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by the Court and Congress to limit federal diversity actions. Reasons for these
limitations include overcrowded federal dockets9 0 and federal-state comity considerations. 91
Although the Court seems to set an absolute rule governing federal court
recognition of ancillary plaintiff-third-party defendant claims, its recognition
92
of the need to consider the context in which the nonfederal claim is asserted
may restrict the instant case's precedential value. Although the Court failed
93
to comment on the lower court's dismissal of the original claim before trial,
this dismissal may have been the decisive factor in the Court's denying this
particular ancillary claim.9 4 In his dissent, Justice White noted the possibility
of such a narrow holding-5 in expressing his desire to retain the discretionary
power of the courts upheld in Gibbs.96
If the Court had not wanted to limit access to federal courts, it could have
reached the opposite result by distinguishing the instant case from Aldinger.
The Aldinger court's emphasis on the great burden raised by bringing a new
party into the court97 would not be applicable to the instant case where the
third-party defendant previously had been properly impleaded by the original
defendant.9s Although ignored by the majority, judicial convenience and exfor the proposal was to lighten the federal courts' load, which will necessarily increase
the states' load, an undesirable result); Meador, A New Approach to Limiting Diversity
jurisdiction, 46 A.BA.J. 383 (1960) (contending that the answer was to eliminate certain
kinds of cases from federal jurisdiction, rather than eliminating diversity jurisdiction);
Currie, supra note 35, at 7-8 (viewing the purpose of diversity jurisdiction as protecting
an outsider from local prejudice, and suggesting that if diversity jurisdiction is retained,
it should be used to meet this purpose). See also Comment, supra note 63, at 259 (offering
other evidence of congressional intent to limit federal diversity jurisdiction, such as increasing the jurisdictional amount requirement to $10,000 and imposing dual citizenship
on corporations [codified at 28 U.S.C. §§1332(a), (c) (1978)]).
90. See 3 MooRa's, supra note 39, at §14.27(1) (although federal dockets are overcrowded, federal courts have the duty to use their conceptual tools to end congestion and
dispose of all related claims with the greatest economy and convenience; otherwise, they add
to diseconomy and inconvenience of litigants in state courts); Frank, supra note 41, at 158
(sole reason for the proposal is overloaded federal dockets).
91. See Burdick, supra note 89, at 1 (focusing on basic principles of federalism). Cf.
Frank, supra note 41, at 158 (comity should not be a problem because federal interaction
with state laws is desirable).

92. See note 62 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the Court's recognition
of this consideration.
93. For discussion of the effect dismissal may have on ancillary jurisdiction, see note
52 supra and accompanying text.
94. The claim being questioned in the instant case was ancillary, rather than pendent,
because it was: (1)not asserted along with a federal claim; and (2) not asserted against
the original defendant. See definitions of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, notes 13 and
46 supra, respectively.
95. 98 S. Ct. at 2408 n.7: "Mhe majority's concerns ... could be met on a case-by-case
basis, rather than by the absolute rule it adopts."
96. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
97. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. at 18. The new party presents "a more serious
obstacle to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction." Id. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
98. See note 5 supra for proper impleader action. In the instant case, the Supreme
Court noted that "the petitioner has never challenged the propriety of the third party
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penditures of substantial time and money by the parties and the court 9 9 should
have been important considerations in this case. In Aldinger these factors
were irrelevant because neither the new party nor the new claim had ever
been present before the court. In light of these considerations, this case
presents an example in which retention of the ancillary claim would appear
to be the only appropriate alternative.1 00
The instant case suggests that future questions of federal jurisdiction
should be subject to the two-tier analysis used by the Court: first, the parties
must meet constitutional minimum requirements; second, statutory jurisdictional requirements must be fulfilled. In taking this approach, the Court
failed to differentiate between questions of constitutional and statutory
compliance when deciding what factors were proper in determining the
existence of jurisdiction. In the case where constitutional minimums are met 101
and the question of jurisdiction depends on statutory interpretation, considerations of judicial economy and fairness to the litigants are legitimate

factors to consider in effectuating congressional intent with respect to the
courts' jurisdictional powers.10 2 Recognition that these are proper considerations in the process of statutory interpretation will result in equitable application of the Court's holding.103

J. RENEE' KASTANAKIS
complaint as such," which suggested that the impleader action was actually improper.
98 S. Ct. at 2400 n.3. See note 6 supra.
99. The lack of diversity of citizenship was not realized until the third day of trial.
See note 9 supra and accompanying text. Substantial commitment of the court's and
litigants' resources was a consideration of the lower court in retaining the ancillary claim.

Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d at 425-26.
100. See C. WRirHT & A. MlnzR §1444, supra note 19, at 237 (instances will occur
where retention would only seem appropriate, such as substantial commitment of resources
by the court or litigants); Note, supra note 49, at 664 (retention seems warranted due to
substantial federal judicial resources being committed, along with litigants' efforts). Irreparable harm to the litigants may also occur due to: (1) a delay in re-entering the state
judicial system; and (2) a running of the statute of limitations before the complaint is
refiled in state court. Id. at 665.
101. See note 72 supra and accompanying text. In making the assumption that the
Gibbs test was the applicable constitutional minimum, the Supreme Court has left the
question to be decided at a later time.
102. Consideration of such factors within the process of statutory interpretation is to
be distinguished from their consideration, as in Gibbs, as a matter of discretion once juris-

dictional power exists. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
103. The instant case, in particular, involved several inequities which the Court failed

to consider once the lack of jurisdictional "power" was determined. 98 S. Ct. at 2405
n.21. Respondents alleged concealment of its citizenship and the possible running of the
state's statute of limitations are factors which may have resulted in petitioner's loss of a
cause of action.
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